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Summary.  Cofounding queens (“cofoundresses”) of the obligate desert fungus garden ant 
Acromyrmex versicolor exhibit a forager specialist who subsumes all foraging risk prior to first 
worker eclosion (Rissing et al. 1989); laboratory observation suggests a "coordination" mechanism 
(sensu Aumann 1974; Rosenthal 1979; cf Pollock 1994b, 1996) assigning task-specific risk 
without contention among (unrelated) cofoundresses (Rissing et al. 1989, 1996).  In an experiment 
designed to mimic a "cheater" who refuses foraging assignment when her lot, cofoundresses 
delayed/failed to replace their forager, usually leading to demise of their garden (Rissing et al. 
1996).  Such behavior is suicidal, as the essential fungus garden cannot be replaced.  Failing to 
replace a cheater is here an extreme punishment where the punisher harms herself to harm the 
cheater (after Radner 1980).  We simulate cofoundress allocation of foraging risk with haploid, 
asexual genotypes which either replace a cheater (at some point, the personally best response) or 
not (suicidal punishment), under both foundress viscosity (likely for A. versicolor) and random 
assortment.  Simulation “fair contests,” with populations initially a 50:50 mix of potential 
replacers and punishers, exposed to mutant cheaters across evolutionary time, reveal (latent) 
suicidal punishment superior (under viscosity) to replacing a cheater.  While replacing is a 
personally best response to cheating, viscosity correlates the descendants of replacers and cheaters, 
ultimately eliminating the former.  Suicidal punishment, however, removes cheaters before they 
reproduce; under viscosity, patches of latent punishers can be quite robust, removing phenotypic 
cheaters as they appear, relative to patches of latent replacers, which rather incubate more cheaters 
by assuming the risky foraging task for them.  In particular, simulations of A. versicolor population 
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ecology reveal (latent) punishment superior, supporting laboratory evidence for suicidal 
punishment in this species (Rissing et al. 1996). 
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    If you want to learn life you must simultaneously learn death. 
 
       Dainin Katagiri (d. 1990ce) 
        (1988:34) 
 
 Self sacrifice is generally explained as either delayed personal return or advantage 
redirected to a relative.  Usually, these are the only acceptable caveats to immediate personal gain.  
Self sacrifice in aid to a non-relative is suspect, plausible only if an investment in one’s future.  
Suicidal sacrifice in such a context is a priori impossible unless channeled ultimately back to a 
relative.  Yet suicide to harm others, with no clear return to relatives, is not without notice among 
humans.  Our first response to such behavior is to label it an unsustainable aberration, at best a 
transient ideological manipulation of an otherwise sound behavioral program (Atran 2003).  Here 
we suggest pause before dismissing such events as unsustainable by considering what we believe 
is suicidal punishment among group founding, unrelated, queens (or cofoundresses) of the desert 
fungus garden ant Acromyrmex versicolor (Pollock and Rissing 1995; Rissing et. al., 1996). 
 
 We advocate no direct analogy with humans, apart from what appears to be suicidal 
sacrifice to harm another; here, as punishment when a group mate (cofoundress) seems to deviate 
from equilibrium play (“cheat”) in an evolutionary game.   Less than suicidal self-sacrificial 
punishment is well known in experimental negotiation games among humans (Güth et. al. 1982, 
Camerer and Thaler 1995, Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; cf Gintis 2000) and perhaps possible in the 
capuchin monkey Cebus apella (Brosnan and de Waal 2003).  Such punishment follows another’s 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 4 
 
 
 
failure to offer a “fair” return, deviating (cheating) from expected equilibrium play.  Structurally, 
the punishment exhibited by A. versicolor is similar to that revealed in primate experiments; an 
individual harms herself, thereby harming her game partner as well, upon the latter’s refusal to 
respond “appropriately.”  Herein we focus on how population structure can amplify such 
punishment to the point of suicide among ant cofoundresses. 
 
 We shall detail the natural history and laboratory design revealing the game environment of 
A. versicolor queens shortly.  Briefly, the (ultimately) suicidal queen has a personally better option 
when exposed to a cheater which experiment reveals she (usually) refuses to take.   Her refusal 
likely leads to the death of her incipient colony as a whole, including herself and her cheating 
fellow queen.  Here we focus, via computer simulation of A. versicolor population ecology and 
variants thereon, on what would happen if she failed to suicidally punish, instead taking the clearly 
identifiable,  personally better option.  We find that such personal survival rarely outperforms 
suicide in evolutionary time, often doing much worse, even though these group founding queens 
are known to be non relatives (e.g., Hagen et. al., 1988; Rissing et. al., 1989). 
 
 This conclusion seems bizarre if we imagine suicidal punishment as normal play, in every 
colony in every generation.  In fact, however, punishment occurs only when another queen 
deviates (cheats) from normal game play; cheaters refuse the assigned risky yet essential task of 
foraging for the group (detailed below).  Suicidal sacrifice amounts to refusing to forage in 
replacement of the cheater, leading ultimately to removal of the colony through later inferior 
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competitive ability in intercolony brood raids (again, detailed below).  Non-punishment is simply 
replacing the cheater as forager, clearly a personally best response over what amounts otherwise to 
colony starvation.  Perhaps surprisingly, our computer simulations show that, generally but not 
always, the descendants of a personally best response replacer are ultimately removed from the 
population, a process which takes several generations. 
 
 The mechanism eliminating these descendants is remarkably simple.  Failure to punish 
nurtures the cheater as well, as the cheater avoids the mortality risk associated with foraging.  
Descendants of the cheater, when cofoundresses in new colonies, repeat the cheating exploitation 
exhibited by their mother, depressing the fitness of descendants of those refusing to punish.  While 
a frequency dependent mixture of the two morphs may result, under parameters simulating the 
population ecology of Acromyrmex versicolor (low dispersal or population viscosity sensu 
Hamilton 1964; significant brood “wars” among adjacent natal colonies; detailed below), the non-
punishing morph often fairs badly, risking stochastic elimination.   
 
 In contrast, a suicidal punisher, by removing the original, exploitative cheater from the 
population, can preserve latent punishment among clones in other natal nests, clones not presently 
exposed to deviating game play (i.e., not exposed to a cheater).  A contingent strategy of 
punishment reveals itself, phenotypically, only when exposed to cheaters.  Such unexposed clones 
are not relatives of the suicide in the normal sense, as measured by coefficients of relatedness; but 
they transmit the potential to punish through their offspring, offspring relatively unexposed to 
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cheaters themselves because of the prior suicidal punishment (cf Pollock 1988 and below).  In 
Acromyrmex versicolor structured populations consisting of both latent punishers and non-
punishers (replacers), the continual introduction of game deviation (mutant cheaters) leads usually, 
but not always, to the elimination of both cheater and non-punisher.  Simulating alternatives to A. 
versicolor’s population ecology while retaining the foraging game weakens this result, revealing 
some cases where non-punishment outlasts (latent) suicidal punishment in evolutionary time.  Yet 
the parameter space inducing this reversal is surprisingly small.  While A. versicolor’s population 
ecology leads to a robust result sustaining latent suicide, we find weaker, similar results over a 
wider range of parameters. 
 
 The phenomenon of suicidal punishment identified in Acromyrmex versicolor is not so 
much aberrant as sporadic, removing mutant deviators, or cheaters, in an already established game; 
punishment is latent most of the time, and that is why suicidal punishment can endure 
evolutionarily.  If our results have any bearing beyond A. versicolor (and possibly another ant 
species where cofoundresses seem embedded in a similar game; Trunzer et. al. 1998), it is, we 
suggest, that our sometimes unvoiced assumptions of the sustainable socially possible may need 
revision.  In A. versicolor, the relative trajectories of suicidal punishment and its alternative 
become clear only after several generations.  Sole focus on the immediate, individual advantage of 
behavior a priori denies the evolutionary dynamic our simulations reveal can support contingent 
suicide.  What fosters personal success in our own lives, or that of most creatures most of the time, 
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cannot, by definition, describe the process we identify here.  That need not deny this or similar 
processes operate somewhere.  How so and how far, we submit, is a salient open question. 
 
 We begin by detailing field and laboratory evidence identifying the population structure 
and foraging game of Acromyrmex versicolor cofoundresses.  Our simulations, based on this 
evidence, are limited herein to a single question: under what conditions can latent suicidal 
punishment outlast, in evolutionary time, an alternative personally best reply, beginning with an 
equal frequency of both types in the population.  Our focus is not on whether the personally best 
reply cannot be evolutionarily viable (e.g., when punishers are excluded), but on the relative 
superiority of latent suicide over this alternative across generations.  Nuanced results on the 
evolutionary stability of both types, when either combined in a population or present without the 
other, will be presented elsewhere. 
 
 Natural history of Acromyrmex versicolor 
  Mating and dispersal 
 Acromyrmex versicolor sexuals ("alates"; Hölldobler and Wilson 1990) usually fly from 
their parental nest after heavy rains in late summer (Wheeler 1917; Rissing et al. 1986; Higgins 
1988).  Alates form small, local mating aggregations (Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1986), perhaps 
the product of 6 to 8 nearby adult colonies; local aggregations sometimes seem somewhat evenly, 
linearly spaced, fading in the distance (Rissing, pers. obs.).  Such "mini-swarm" spacing seems a 
consequence of the regular spacing of adult colonies contributing sexuals.  Adult colonies are 
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territorial, generally located under mature  dominant Sonoran trees (e.g., Olneya tesota; Gamboa 
1974; Rissing et al. 1986), whose leaves they harvest (Gamboa 1975).  Limited water forces some 
distance between large trees; hence adult colonies are similarly spaced and, under low, viscous 
(sensu Hamilton 1964) dispersal, so too are mating aggregations. 
 
 Immediately after mating, female alates (now foundresses) leave the local aggregation in 
search of a nesting site.  They seem not to go far, often removing their wings near the mating 
aggregation, surveying their environs by foot (Rissing, pers. obs.).  Foundresses prefer to establish 
nests under the canopy of the same tree species associated with adult colonies; indeed, they prefer 
the canopy edge of these trees, where branches frequently droop to the ground, permitting easy and 
relatively safe access to leaves during future colony development.  Consequently, starting nests are 
clumped (Rissing et al. 1986).  Foundresses collected from such single-tree clumped natal nests 
exhibit little electrophoretic genetic variation (Hagen et al. 1988), consistent with field observation 
suggesting low dispersal. 
 
  Since adult colonies are territorial, starting colonies underneath an "occupied" tree are 
almost certainly eliminated within the first year (cf  Hölldobler 1976, 1981;  Mabelis 1979; 
Hölldobler and Carlin 1985; Pollock and Rissing 1989; Pfennig 1995).  Similarly, and crucially for 
our simulations, clumped starting nests can expect unavoidable inter-colony competition for sole 
possession of a currently "adult-unoccupied" tree (Pollock and Rissing 1989).  This expectation 
shapes subsequent foundress behavior. 
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  Cofoundress interaction during nest foundation: task partitioning during nest 
   excavation 
 Acromyrmex versicolor foundresses are facultatively "pleometrotic" (Hölldobler and 
Wilson 1977, 1990; Rissing and Pollock 1988), establishing nests together cooperatively (Rissing 
et al. 1986; cf Higgins 1988).  As foundresses dig they are often joined by others 
("cofoundresses").  There is no evidence that foundresses select one another (contrast Nonacs 
1992; Noë and Hammerstein 1994) in the field (Hagen et al. 1988; Higgins 1988; Rissing, pers. 
obs.) or in the laboratory (Rissing et al. 1986, 1989, 1996; Higgins 1988); nor is there any evidence 
that some are coerced into joining others (Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1986, 1996).  As excavation 
proceeds, a division of labor emerges which ultimately places one cofoundress under exclusive 
risk.  Once sufficient underground nest space exists, one foundress tends to exclusively remove 
soil to the surface (Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1996), her cofoundresses (more or less) excavating 
underground.  Such task partitioning speeds construction of an underground haven beyond the 
(olfactory) inspection of above ground predators such as night rodents and lizards, which dig about 
the surface in search of cofoundress burrows (Rissing, pers. obs.; cf Rissing and Pollock 1986; 
Anderson and Ratnieks 2000).  The surface excavator does not, then, subsume unique risk in her 
task, but simply plays her part in efficiently producing a haven where exposure otherwise likely 
leads to common death.  Yet, days after this communal danger has past, the surface excavator 
"voluntarily" assumes a most risky task, exposing herself uniquely to above-ground predation for 
weeks by foraging for her cofoundresses. 
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  Cofoundress interaction during nest foundation:  foraging specialization 
 In most obligate fungus gardening ants, foundresses initially rear their fungus on their own 
body reserves, producing "trophic" eggs consumed by the fungus (e.g., Mintzer and Vinson 1985; 
Hölldobler and Wilson 1990; Diehl-Fleig and de Araújo 1996) until the first cohort of workers 
forage for leaves.  Acromyrmex versicolor foundresses seem unable to avoid foraging for their 
fungus prior to worker eclosion (emergence from pupae).  Remarkably, a single foundress assumes 
all pre-worker foraging risk (Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1989); more remarkably, the task is not 
competitively allocated (sensu West Eberhard 1981; Heinze et al. 1994; Hölldobler and Carlin 
1985; Kolmer and Heinze 2000), but, rather, assumed by the prior surface excavator specialist 
(Rissing et al. 1996). 
 
 In laboratory colonies, several days elapse between nest excavation and foraging.  Yet 
cofoundresses are never seen to either overtly or "ritually”contest or avoid the forager role (Rissing 
et al. 1989, 1996; Pachycondyla villosa also exhibits uncontested forager assignment, Trunzer et. 
al. 1998).  Nor, as noted, is the surface excavator role itself the subject of contention, as predation 
threat precludes "negotiation.”  Nor does kin selection seem operative, as cofoundresses collected 
from the field are not related as measured by available electrophoretic variance (Hagen et al. 1988) 
and, unlike, e.g., Polistine wasp cofoundresses, who are differentially hostile to non-relatives 
and/or non-parental nestmates (e.g., Ross and Gamboa 1981; Post and Jeanne 1982; Klahn and 
Gamboa 1983), A. versicolor foundresses associate freely (Rissing et al. 1986; Hagen 1988; cf  
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Bartz and Hölldobler 1982;  Ross and Fletcher 1985; Rissing and Pollock 1986, 1988; Hölldobler 
and Wilson 1990; Sasaki et al. 1996; Heinze et. al. 2001 [with latent, contingent aggression, 
Kolmer and Heinze 2000]; Trunzer et. al. 1998; Carew et. al. 1997; for similar tolerance among 
cofoundresses in other ant species).  The correlation between surface excavator and later forager 
specialization does, however, conform to the game-theoretic definition of a "coordination 
mechanism" in economics (Aumann 1974; Rosenthal 1974; Myerson 1986; Cripps 1991). 
 
  Surface excavation as a coordination mechanism 
 A coordination mechanism uses some arbitrary, public event to assign tasks or roles 
differentially among game partners or groupmates (Aumann 1974; Rosenthal 1974; cf Pollock 
1994b; 1995a; 1996).  The event is arbitrary in that task assignment is not a consequence of 
individual ability or propensity (contrast, e.g., Nonacs 1992; Reeve and Nonacs 1992), but rather 
of (correlated) circumstance, with initial random task assignment to one individual shifting the 
expected assignment of others; the event is public in that the "outcome" of task assignments are 
"known" (in the game theoretic sense of inferred; e.g., Myerson 1991) to all partners.  A surface 
excavator specialist meets these conditions.  If no one deposited soil to the surface, digging would 
be impossible--there would be no room to maneuver within the nest; the disappearance of soil 
indicates someone is a surface excavator.  Those digging inside the nest "know" this, as does the 
surface excavator herself; assignment is public.  And, as noted earlier, surface assignment is not 
contested but rather the outcome of arbitrary position within the nest as all frantically dig while in 
common jeopardy, employing spatial task assignments common among social insect workers 
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(Hölldobler and Wilson 1990; Schatz et. al. 1995; Ratnieks and Anderson 1999; Robson et. al. 
2002).  Once such a mechanism exists it may be employed to assign tasks of  similar structure (one 
surface excavator, one forager). 
 
 The existence of such a mechanism does not guarantee evolutionary viability.  Consequent 
task assignment (forager specialist) must be an equilibrium, with "strategy morphs" refusing 
assignment eliminated in evolutionary time.  An individual foraging when she need not seems 
trivially unviable, but what of an assigned forager refusing her task?  In this case an individual 
replacing her would perform a personally best response, assuming no other groupmate is willing to 
forage.  But, if so, an assigned forager may be tempted to shirk her task and assigned risk.  The 
simplest game-theoretic solution is to refuse the personally best response (replacement) when 
exposed to a shirker (cf Aumann 1974; Rosenthal 1974; Radner 1980), contrary to the heuristic of 
individual advantage common in behavioral ecology (e.g., Dawkins 1976, 1982; Pollock 1994b).  
Experimentally, this is the case (Pollock and Rissing 1995; Rissing et al. 1996). 
    
  Experimental evidence for punishment 
 While unable to force a cofoundress to refuse her task ("cheat" on coordination), we can 
alter the perceptions of her cofoundresses so that she appears to cheat; such perceptions constitute 
the individually specific information sets of economic game theory (Myerson 1991).  Consider a 
set of three-queen laboratory natal colonies, each having developed a (uniquely marked) forager 
specialist.  Divide the colonies into two treatments.  In one, the forager is removed while foraging 
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(she "dies" while outside the nest)--the controls; in the other, the forager is blocked when trying to 
leave the nest, but her cofoundresses are not--the experimentals.  Details may be found in Rissing 
et al. (1996).  In the controls, remaining cofoundresses experience an event which occurs in nature 
(forager death) and should replace her.  In the experimentals, they perceive an assigned forager 
failing to leave the nest even though, upon personal inspection, exit is unblocked.  The between 
treatment differential response time for non-foragers to replace the original forager is a measure of 
cofoundress response to cheating.  To the extent experimental non-foragers delay replacement of a 
"cheater" beyond the time it takes to replace a lost forager, they punish (sensu Axelrod 1980; 
Radner 1980; Boyd and Richerson 1992; and below) the cheater by suppressing potential colony 
fitness, measured as health of the fungus garden; we shall see shortly that fungus health likely has 
a nonlinear effect on natal colony survival .  As resources are held in common, punishers hurt 
themselves as well. 
 
 Call an original non-forager a replacement when she appears near the nest entrance, 
whether or not she exits to the surface.  We say a replacement forages when she actually leaves the 
nest to inspect a small attached foraging arena.  Table 1 summarizes (originally coordinated) 
nonforager response by treatment across four measures.  While all control colonies exhibited a 
foraging replacement, thereby retaining a healthy fungus garden, 7 of 10 experimentals allowed 
their fungus to die (Rissing et. al., 1996); these latter colonies would have no chance of survival, 
so the cofoundresses refusing to replace their perceived “cheater” have suicidally punished.  
Overall, experimentals took twice as long to produce a replacement forager, suffering an eight fold 
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reduction in pupae/larvae and seven-fold reduction in fungus mass relative to controls.  Other 
laboratory and comparative evidence suggest such a reduction in colony development would be 
disastrous in nature. 
 
  Intercolony competition as brood raiding 
 As noted earlier, adult territoriality in A. versicolor implies that natal nests clumped under a 
tree must ultimately engage in intense intercolony competition for sole possession of the tree.  
Several ant species with such adult territoriality exhibit competition among natal nests in the form 
of "brood raiding" in both laboratory (Bartz and Hölldobler 1982; Rissing and Pollock 1987, 1991; 
Tschinkel 1992a; Sommer and Hölldobler 1995) and field (Rissing, pers. obs.; Tschinkel 1992a,b; 
Hahn and Tschinkel [1997:335] suggest competition among clumped natal nests leads to exclusive, 
regularly spaced, adult territoriality in the arboreal ant Crematogaster ashmeadi); laboratory 
evidence suggests the same for A. versicolor (Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1989; Pollock and 
Rissing 1995; see Pollock and Rissing 1989 for further cases).  When foragers from clumped natal 
nests encounter a "rival" nest, they rush in, absconding with brood which they take to their own, 
returning for more (cf Rissing and Pollock 1987; Tschinkel 1992a).  While workers from 
competing nests may fight upon encounter, the attacked nest begins reciprocal "brood raids" on the 
attacking nest, once located. 
 
 Size of the initial worker force is crucial to raiding, with relative worker number likely 
affecting competitive success nonlinearly (cf Wilson 1990; Pollock and Rissing 1995).  In at least 
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three species with brood raiding among clumped natal nests, those nests with more queens produce 
more workers (Rissing and Pollock 1987, 1991; Tschinkel 1992a; Sommer and Hölldobler 1995) 
and, where measured, are more likely to win the raiding contest (Rissing and Pollock 1987, 1991; 
Tschinkel 1992a).  Intense intercolony competition among natal nests leading to adult territoriality 
seems, then, a likely selective force underlying group life among A. versicolor queens (Rissing and 
Pollock 1987; Pollock and Rissing 1989), with intracolony punishment leading to the competitive 
demise of colonies with cheaters upon brood war encounter of an internally (forager game) 
coordinated, rival colony. 
 
 Simulation design 
 Our simulation design allows us to duplicate Acromyrmex versicolor’s (inferred) 
population ecology as well as create significant deviations thereon, reducing the importance of 
brood raiding for colony survival and/or allowing foundresses to mix randomly throughout the 
population, rather than viscously.  We begin with a population of 100 adult colonies, each under its 
own tree, connected as the circumference of a circle.  Each year (not colony generation, as a 
colony may live many years), each living adult colony produces haploid asexual foundresses 
which disperse to the two neighboring trees.  Foundresses are modeled haploid to avoid  allele 
dominance or penetrance; the assumption is common in models of behavioral ecology (e.g., 
Wilson and Dugatkin 1991; Taylor 1992a,b).  Sex is precluded in this first blush analysis to avoid 
the extra parameter of relative male/female dispersal.  If a location on our circle has an active adult 
colony, all foundresses settling there are destroyed; only when the adult colony has died is 
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successful colony foundation possible.  Each year, each adult colony dies with a given probability, 
independently of its age and independently of its neighbors, with one proviso:  to insure an 
unoccupied tree will always be "seeded" by a new natal colony, three contiguous colonies on our 
circle never die in the same year, for neighbor dispersal would then leave the middle tree 
unoccupied; this proviso is for programming ease and computational speed.  We use an 
"independent" adult colony death rate of 5%, giving an expected adult lifetime of 20 years, a bit on 
the high side of A. versicolor, but not implausible (Rissing, per. obs.). 
 
 Each natal colony is established by three cofoundresses.  82.5% of all foundresses collected 
at one site in one year were pleometrotic, with an average of 3.67 queens per colony (Rissing et al. 
1986).  But the modal number of queens per natal colony was two (16 of 36 pleometrotic 
colonies); as two foundress nests are likely to lose brood wars relative to the 55% of pleometrotic 
nests with three or more queens (after Rissing  and Pollock 1987, 1991; Tschinkel 1992a), we 
restrict attention to the simplest n-person environment, although our simulations do not in this 
respect duplicate field evidence. 
 
 Underneath a simulation tree location, foundresses sort randomly, without preference for 
parental nestmates; kin recognition does not occur.  For computational speed 5 natal colonies are 
created under a vacant tree, all surviving until the brood raiding phase.  Each natal colony 
produces a colony fitness derived from cofoundress behavior on foraging task assignment; once 
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fitnesses are assigned, the brood raiding winner is a random draw of the five colonies, weighted by 
their fitnesses. 
 
 We idealize foraging as a single event.  Once a “forager” is assigned, either through initial 
coordination or replacement of a cheater, she makes one foraging trip, falling prey to above ground 
mortality with some uniform probability per simulation.  If she dies, she nonetheless manages to 
return with food before death.  Thus forager death does not affect colony fitness; only the initial 
presence or absence of a forager does.  Actually, of course, a forager faces mortality over many 
trips, her death truncating colony fitness until replaced.  By ignoring the fine grain of multiple trips 
and, possibly, multiple replacements after forager deaths, we have a best-case scenario for cheaters 
on coordination; a cheater who is replaced is never subject to forager mortality, as she would if the 
only remaining foundress upon death of her cofoundresses.  Apart from the advantage to cheaters, 
we avoid finer grain for computational speed. 
 
 In at least two species of pleometrotic ants with brood raiding, cofoundresses engage in 
lethal combat with one another for sole possession of the nest after cooperative production of the 
initial "brood raiding force" (Messor [Veromessor] pergandei, Rissing and Pollock 1987 and 
Lasius niger, Sommer and Hölldobler 1995; perhaps too the monogynous form of Solenopsis 
invicta, Tschinkel 1992a,b).  Acromyrmex versicolor does not; rather, cofoundresses coexist 
peacefully for several years in the laboratory (cf Bekkevold et al. 1999 for another apparently 
polygynous Acromyrmex).  Thus, in simulated colonies, only forager mortality and brood wars 
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filter queen reproduction.  Adult colonies with multiple queens likely produce no more alates than 
those with single queens (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990); worker number plateaus to cover the 
foraging arena centered under their tree, and it is worker, not queen, number which limits alate 
(sexuals) production through food availability.  Each adult colony thus produces the same 
(assumed large) number of alates, shared equitably among remaining queens. 
 
  Strategies 
 We restrict strategies to the minimal two stage game permitting a response to cheating on 
coordination.  In the first stage, the "assigned forager" (chosen randomly among the three queens 
at natal colony foundation) makes a "strategic decision” to accept her risky assignment or not.  If 
she accepts, the game is over, with her mortality and colony fitness calculated; if not, the game 
enters the second stage, where her cofoundresses decide whether or not to replace.  We consider 
four (haploid, single locus) strategies which define response in both stages: 
 
P punisher, which accepts original foraging assignment, but never replaces a shirker 
refusing foraging assignment; motivated by experimental data. 
 
Q quitter, which neither accepts original assignment nor replaces another shirking 
assignment; motivated by the cheater critique of “group optimal” behavior (e.g., Williams 
1966; Pollock and Rissing 1995).  Q unilaterally refuses to forage, ignoring initial 
coordination or its loss, so “quits” the game. 
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R replacer, which accepts original forager assignment and also replaces another 
shirking such assignment.  R plays a personally best response (after Selten 1975; West 
Eberhard 1981; Myles 1988; Farrell and Maskin 1989) when exposed to a cheater refusing 
foraging assignment. 
 
C a sophisticated cheater, included to complete the "strategy space," which will not 
accept original forager assignment but will replace another shirking such assignment.  C 
shirks original assignment but acknowledges, when exposed to a shirker, that replacement 
is personally best.  Thus C is a "cheating variant" on R in the same sense that Q is a 
cheating variant on P (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 categorizes the strategies by the two sequential decision properties of accepting 
assignment and replacing.  Both P,R accept coordination while Q,C do not.  Neither P,Q will 
replace a shirker, while R,C will, the latter two employing a personally best response to failed 
coordination by another.  Whether a punishing P,Q is suicidal depends on whether a replacer is 
(not) also present in the colony.  Suicide is not an immediate consequence of punishment, but 
becomes so when colonies contain only punishers; even so, commitment to endure suicide as 
potential consequence is absolute.  Sometimes there will be two replacing morphs in a group (RR, 
RC, or CC), with a (randomly assigned) shirker on original coordination (Q or C).  When so, we 
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choose the replacer randomly, ignoring contest among multiple replacers, such as a potential war 
of attrition (e.g., Bishop and Cannings 1978; Maynard Smith 1982). 
 
  Mutation 
 Herein we ask only how robust coordination strategies P and R are to cheating.  Denote “X 
mutates to Y,” by “X e Y,” with “g” indicating mutation in both directions.  We consider two 
mutation regimes: 1) P, R e Q, where first stage (surface excavator) coordinators mutate to 
quitting the game, refusing to forage at all; and 2) P, R e Q, C, where initial coordination is lost 
while replacement may (with C) or may not (with Q) exist, with Q g C.  Q g C is allowed in the 
latter case to enhance the potential diversity of cheaters, as our focus is on the relative resistence of 
P,R to generic cheating.  Precluding the sophisticated shirker/replacer C as a mutant has non-
trivial consequence.  We will see that allowing both types of cheater rather than just Q depresses 
the range of coordination, not necessarily in favor of C, rather sometimes in favor of Q.  C can 
create intermediate population states which are more readily invaded by quitter Q. 
 
 Mutations occur immediately after natal colony creation, before coordinated forager 
assignment.  Once a "colony genotype" is created by local random choice of three females from 
the tree-specific alate pool, each cofoundress undergoes a "mutation opportunity" from her present 
type as allowed by the simulation specific mutation rule.  A high mutation rate of .001 is employed 
for clear results; as a high rate favors cheaters (not coordinators), we do not think this limiting.  Of 
course, real queens do not mutate in natal colonies.  Since queens assort neither positively nor 
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negatively by strategy type, it matters not when we mutate types, so long as prior to the foraging 
game.  “Mutation” after colony foundation is a simulation convenience, reducing random number 
calls. 
 
 Each simulation employs numerous random number calls over as many as 100,000 years: 
calls for adult colony death, creation of cofoundress genotypes, mutation events, forager deaths, 
and brood war victories.  The random number generator must robustly mimic a uniform 
distribution in (0,1); we employ "ran2" advocated in Press et al. (1992:281-282), which should not 
cycle for at least 2 x 1018 calls.  Our simulation is in C++ ®. 
 
  Colony efficiency and failed coordination 
 Failed coordination entails a depression in colony competitive ability (fitness) via brood 
raiding, the degree of which we vary.  We standardize perfect coordination as a colony fitness of 
1000; this value is obtained by any colony with either R or P the (randomly) designated forager (as 
both accept foraging assignment), regardless of  cofoundress strategy types.  Ideally, a QQQ 
colony (or, e.g., PPQ with Q the assigned forager; QQC with C the assigned forager) should have 
zero fitness, as neither P,Q replacement forages, so the colony's fungus must die.  It would then be 
possible for all natal colonies under an unoccupied tree to die, leaving the tree empty.  For 
computational simplicity we avoid this, assigning such a colony a fitness of 1, not zero; after some 
long delay even a QQQ colony manages some foraging to avoid fungus death.  This is somewhat 
compatible with experiment, where experimental colonies exhibited replacement before fungus 
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death in 3 of 10 trials, albeit after significant delay and considerable reduction in fungus mass 
(Rissing et. al., 1996; Table 1).  Such small colony fitness will be two or three orders of magnitude 
less than any competing colony with a forager (see below); we think this differential sufficiently 
near suicide while avoiding the computational cost of vacant trees over potentially several 
generations.  Thus a non-foraging colony’s fitness is important only when all natal colonies under 
a tree have no forager. 
 
 Many  results hinge on the reduction in colony fitness born by colonies with realized 
replacers (a replacing R or C).  There are two reasons for believing this reduction relatively great.  
First, brood wars likely amplify colony fitness differentials (measured by fungus mass or worker 
number) nonlinearly, the essential reduction being in (zero sum) brood raiding success.  Second, 
recall that the coordination mechanism employs the cofoundress with unique prior above ground 
exposure (the surface excavator).  This prior surface activity makes her most efficient at orienting 
to the nest during initial foraging exploration (cf Bisch-Knaden and Wehner 2003).  The effect 
should amplify with effort (repeated surface excavation trips), as social insect workers learn with 
experience (e.g., Schmid-Hempel and Schmid-Hempel 1984; Hölldobler and Wilson 1990; 
O'Donnell and Jeanne 1992; Dukas and Visscher 1994; Schatz et al. 1995; Ratnieks and Anderson 
1999).  A cofoundress replacing a prior surface excavator as forager lacks this initial experience, 
which should both depress her relative foraging efficiency and amplify her relative predation risk; 
recall that worker number increases with queen number, so enhanced predation risk in itself will 
depress later colony brood raiding ability .  Since brood wars are zero sum in outcome, 
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replacement colony fitnesses represent the nonlinear effect of (potentially) small changes in both 
foraging efficiency and predation risk on brood raiding, rather than absolute reduction in fungus 
mass alone.  We employ two values for reduced colony fitness upon replacement of the assigned 
forager, 200 and 900, relative to a perfect colony coordination of 1000, simulating either 80% or 
10% reduction in absolute colony competitive ability upon loss of the surface excavator’s prior 
orientation (strong vs weak brood raiding).   
 
  Simulation initial conditions and “fair contest wins” 
 Suicidal punishment in Acromyrmex versicolor aids neither self nor colony relative, as the 
suicide’s group is destroyed en mass.  We cannot, then, measure a direct gain for suicide as, say, 
for a sterile social insect worker aiding her mother or sisters.  But strategy P is only contingently 
suicidal, so we can measure changes in its relative frequency after suicidal acts; abstractly, this is 
similar to measuring the fitness of an allele coding for worker sterility by examining the fitness of 
her mother.  Since we do not have a focal recipient to monitor, we examine long term relative 
frequencies of both P and best response alternative R.   Intuition focuses on the dilemma of suicide 
by considering an individual deciding whether or not to replace.  Our simulations cannot do this 
directly, as strategies are deterministic.  We capture this choice by beginning each simulation trial 
as a fair contest with 50 contiguous adult PPP colonies on the tree circle, the other 50 contiguous 
RRR.  Each simulation trial runs until either (a) one but not both of P, R has vanished, with the 
survivor at least 95% of the population (relative to present cheating morphs, either Q or both C, 
Q); or (b) both P, R are lost and some cheating morph is at least 95% of the population.  Each 
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simulation parameter set can run for 100,000 years (usually < 10,000) and is duplicated 200 times.  
A run terminating at year 100,000, with neither condition fulfilled, is a "tie" no matter what the 
relative frequencies of surviving strategies; this happens rarely (but crucially, in one case; Table 
6).  The relative number of P vs R "wins" across 200 trials provides a measure of each strategy’s 
standing against the other under "fair starting conditions.”  To permit clear victory, back mutation 
to P, R from Q, C is precluded; similarly P g R mutation.  Our results do not examine 
evolutionary stability in the usual sense, but rather the relative viability of suicide over 
replacement.  We find that, under most simulation parameters, punishment outperforms 
replacement:  P wins against R, or coordination is lost to cheaters.  Simulations directly addressing 
evolutionary stability (allowing back mutation from cheaters and P g R mutation) confirm the 
superiority of suicidal punishment over personally best replacement under the same conditions 
yielding relative superiority in fair contest wins herein; but stability results are sufficiently nuanced 
to merit separate, deferred analysis. 
 
 We duplicate the parameter sets (various forager mortalities ranging from 0 to 1; colony 
fitness upon forager replacement of 200 or 900) under both viscosity and "random assortment"; in 
the latter, living adult colonies contribute alates to a global (free-mixing) pool, from which five 
natal colonies are produced for each vacant tree.  While suicidal P does (sometimes significantly) 
worse under random assortment, wins generally shift to some combination of cheaters rather than 
to R.  That is, generally, first stage coordination (surface excavator becoming forager) is lost 
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when suicidal punisher P does poorly.   We denote simulations employing, say, 200 replacement 
fitness, .5 forager death under viscosity by {200, .5, v}, under random assortment by {200 ,.5, r}. 
 
 Results 
  “Fair contest” wins under Acromyrmex versicolor’s population ecology 
 Acromyrmex versicolor foundresses disperse locally, with natal colonies later enduring 
significant brood raiding for sole possession of a tree.  Table 3 presents "fair contest" results for 
this ecology by employing a low colony forager replacement fitness (high cost for lost 
coordination, so strong brood raiding) of 200.  Even with a replacement colony fitness of 200 and a 
simulated forager mortality as high as .8, a foundress should replace a cheater to maximize 
expected personal gain: 
[forager survival]*[replacement fitness]/[3 foundresses] = .2(200/3)  > 
   [minimal fitness] / [3 foundresses] = 1/3. 
At no value of simulated (positive) forager death does personally best replacement R fair better 
than suicidal punishment P (Table 3).  P outperforms R robustly at forager mortality .8; with 90% 
forager death, quitter Q predominates whether or not the more sophisticated shirker/replacer C is 
allowed. 
 
 While personal best response R exposed to a quitting (cheating) Q trivially does personally 
better than a suicidal P so exposed, R's personal superiority "incubates" Q offspring for the next 
generation; if she survives, so does her cheating cofoundress.  Neighboring-tree alate dispersal 
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places these incubated Q offspring disproportionately among the offspring of this very R; by 
surviving, R enhances the frequency of group (brood war) inefficient cheating environments 
encountered by her immediate descendants (cf Pollock 1988, 1989a).  As forager death increases, 
Q's supplanting of R quickens, as there are fewer surviving replacement foragers to dilute the 
representation of Q in future local alate pools.   A relatively long-lived spatially specific Q 
frequency, beyond the background mutation probability globally experienced by R's "rival" P, is 
focused on future R's.  
 
 Suicidal P, in contrast, sacrifices itself to eliminate encountered cheating (coordination 
denying) Q.  Of course, a Q not assigned the forager role is phenotypically neutral with respect to 
similar P, but this just delays the effect until Q descendants are so assigned.  Under viscous 
dispersal, a suicidal P’s neighboring rival natal colonies often consist solely of  P, as they are 
derived from the same pool of local alates.  Sacrificing herself to eliminate Q, the cheater exposed 
P aids her strategy clones in nearby groups (Pollock 1988), eliminating the (potential) offspring of 
encountered Q from the social environment of the brood war victor's descendants.  Paradoxically, 
what would be an evolutionary rival of our focal, suicidal P under perfect coordination (another 
nearby natal colony engaged in brood raiding) becomes, under expressed punishment, the indirect 
recipient of her (punishing) aid.  Under viscosity, suicide is effective when the frequency of P is 
high among rival tree arena natal colonies.  Suicide, eliminating a cheater and her descendants 
from the locale, helps retain this high frequency in future tree arenas.  A personally best response 
of replacement has the opposite effect. 
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 Inspecting the spatial trajectory of simulations with forager mortalities .5 and .8, one sees 
quitter Q grow in a patch of replacer R until the latter are eliminated; then, encountering punishing 
P along the boundary of a now Q patch, P  pushes the patch back until Q is locally eliminated (see 
J. B. Wilson 1987; Pollock 1989b for similar processes).  Viscosity now works against Q for, as it 
disproportionately encounters itself, it is more likely to exist in abysmally inefficient social 
(forager uncoordinated) environments with a colony fitness of 1 (see above; cf Pollock 1989a,b); 
as in kin selection, uncooperative Q is eliminated via self-clumping (cf Wilson 1983, Pollock 
1996, Wilson and Dugatkin 1997). 
 
  Even so, for sufficiently high forager death, P fails against Q.  Suppose forager death 
unavoidable (forager death of 1 in Table 3); P can then persist only if foraging (apart from 
punishment) aids relatives (clones) in her group (kin selection).  Viscous dispersal mediated by 
neighboring trees seems incapable of providing sufficient intra-group relatedness (probability of 
clonal encounter) to preserve P (Tables 3 and 4; cf Murray and Gerrard 1984; J. B. Wilson 1987; 
Wilson et al. 1992; Taylor 1992,a,b for similar limitations on viscosity).  Spatial proximity is less 
exclusive to foreign genotypes than a kin rule insuring common ancestry by immediate descent.  
Kin grouping can actively preclude group association among different types; viscosity can not.  
Viscosity forms more QQP groups with P the designated forager than will kin assortment; indeed, 
under the extreme case of  asexual haploid inheritance employed herein, such kin groups cannot 
occur under sibling assortment except by mutation.  With mandatory forager death these groups 
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occur sufficiently frequently under viscosity to insure P's elimination.  Thus while a suicidally 
punishing P in a PQQ group eliminates cheaters, P foraging under certain death incubates these Q, 
much as a replacing R does.  Continuity implies similar logic for sufficiently high yet uncertain 
forager death, with evolutionary advantage (through the removal of Q's through punishment) 
shifting to P as forager death decreases.  Stability simulations (deferred) show P robustly stable 
(for 500,000 years) under {200, .8, v} with Q only mutation, slightly less so when the 
shirker/replacer C is allowed. 
  
  C facilitation of Q 
 While the shirker/replacer C is itself unviable at 200 replacement fitness, suicidal P fairs 
significantly better against quitter Q when C is precluded (Table 3).  When present, C wins on 
only one occasion (with certain forager death); yet P's relative success over Q is enhanced 
dramatically at 90% forager death when C is excluded.  Clumped C's colony fitness is 200 times 
that of clumped Q, as C replaces its own phenotypically refusing type while Q does not (i.e., CCC 
groups have a forager, while QQQ groups do not; cf Table 2).  Clumped C will thus be harder for 
P to defeat (push back) than clumped Q.  For the same reason, replacer R patches are even more 
vulnerable to C than Q, as C limits the harm it does to itself when clumped.  But C is even more 
vulnerable to Q than R is to Q (maximal fitness differential across colonies is 200:1, CCC vs 
QQQ, not 1000:1, RRR vs QQQ).  Inspecting the spatial trajectory of simulations, when C is 
allowed, R patches become C patches which become Q patches.  P then "eats" or “pushes back” 
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the Q patch, as before.  The cycle repeats, as R persists for some time by drifting into P patches 
when phenotypically neutral (i.e., absent cheaters). 
 
 Even so, with recurrent shirker/replacer C mutants, two factors work against P, potentially 
terminating the cycle in a Q win.  First, C invading an R patch causes the ultimate size of Q 
patches encountered by P to be greater.  Stochastically, it takes P longer, so is more difficult, to 
eliminate Q.  Second, C can, under our mutation rule, create a self-cluster without R by mutating 
from P.  Stochastically created CCC groups, although inferior to forager coordinated PPP groups, 
are eliminated (stochastically) at a slower rate than are similarly placed QQQ groups, the latter 
refusing to forage at all.   These C clusters can expand by drifting against selection which, when 
themselves invaded by a mutant Q, continue the cycle without prior R incubation of C,Q.  
Repeated dips in P's frequency result, which can ultimately lead to its stochastic elimination in the 
finite 100 adult colony population.  Simply, as P pushes back Q clusters only stochastically, each 
(partly) stochastic dip in P’s frequency chances its population wide elimination. 
 
 This effect is confirmed by extended simulations of P’s evolutionary viability against 
repeated invasion by either C,Q combined or Q alone (absent replacer R in both cases).  While we 
defer detailed discussion, in an evolutionary stability run of P with continual C,Q mutation under 
{200, .8, v} (beginning with an all P population), suicidal P persisted at overall high frequency for 
over 450,000 years, with the (spatially local) cycle P --> C --> Q --> P repeating until P's fairly 
rapid stochastic loss to quitter Q around year 455,000 (cf Pollock 1989b for a similar, albeit 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 30 
 
 
 
deterministic process).  When allowing only Q mutation, however, P was robustly high for 
500,000 years (P’s relative frequency, fP  > .5; fP   > .9  92.1%).  Personally best response R was 
eliminated by year 4,500 under otherwise identical stability trials (absent P) whether mutation was 
either Q or C,Q.  
 Reducing intergroup competition 
 Table 4 duplicates Table 3 with a colony fitness of 900 under  replacement foraging (weak 
brood raiding).  Here brood raiding ability is rather unaffected by a cheating/replacement event, 
being reduced by just 10%.  We should then expect higher (stochastic) local frequency “bursts” of 
coordination shirkers Q or C, once introduced as mutants.  Such is the case, but the effect need not 
be inevitably detrimental to P, as we shall shortly see. 
 
 C, Q mutation.  With C, Q mutation, shirking original forager assignment is ubiquitous in 
{900, [.2,1], v}, with quitter Q replacing C for sufficiently high forager mortality (> .8; Table 4).  
Recall that clustered C's "stochastic viability" among P (e.g., 1000:200 colony fitness ratio; Table 
3) is related directly to C's resistance to clustered Q (e.g, 200:1 colony fitness ratio).  As  
shirker/replacer C improves against coordinated groups (with a 1000:900 colony fitness ratio) it 
also improves against Q (with a  900:1 colony fitness ratio).  But a replacing C nonetheless 
potentially incubates quitting Q, more so as forager mortality increases.  For sufficiently great 
mortality ({900, .8. v}; Table 4), such incubation so depresses the creation of CCC groups that Q 
is victorious. 
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 We have truncated the game to two stages, so (absent P) only Q can shirk replacing a 
shirker (in CQQ groups, with one of the Q the assigned forager).  But, once C is prevalent, we 
could apply the same logic to further reduce colony efficiency, introducing a shirker who waits just 
a little longer than an average C to replace the originally assigned forager (cf Selten 1975, 1978; 
Selten and Stoecker 1986; Schuessler 1989; Pollock 1991, 1995b; Cressman 1996 for similar 
processes); C's success at high colony replacement fitness and low forager mortality (Table 4) may 
be more an artifact of our 2-stage game than a biological prediction.  We defer further analysis to 
concentrate on the relative advantage of (first stage game) surface excavator/forager coordinators 
P,R herein. 
 
 Q only mutation.  Under 900 replacement fitness and forager deaths in [.5, .9], P wins 
robustly when C is precluded (Table 4), much as under 200 replacement fitness (Table 3).  
Interestingly, P surpasses its performance at forager death .5, relative to 200 replacement fitness 
(Tables 3, 4).  High replacement fitness causes replacing R to successfully incubate more Q 
quitters, as failed first stage coordination groups with a replacement forager are more likely to 
survive (colony fitnesses ratio is 1000:900 rather than 1000:200).  In consequence, replacer R 
patches are more easily invaded, accelerating R’s demise; while R won 45% of all fair contest 
trials at {200, .5, v} with Q only mutation (Table 3), R never wins a parallel {900, .5, v} trial 
(Table 4).  Punisher P, however, continues to eliminate Q clusters at the same rate as under 200 
replacement fitness, as neither P, Q replace.  Consequently, P here fairs better under weak rather 
than strong brood raiding with Q only mutation, winning 98% of the former while just 54% in the 
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latter ({900, .5, v)} vs {200, .5, v}).  When  shirker/replacer C is allowed, P fairs better under 
strong brood raiding, which limits the invasion potential of this strategy.  However, absent C, P 
fairs best under weak brood raiding, as replacer R there more rapidly destroys itself by incubating 
its own future exploiter, Q. 
 
 Intergroup competition absent forager risk: replacement outperforms 
suicidal punishment 
 
 With 900 replacement fitness, personally best response R predominates ("wins") over 
suicidal punisher P with no forager death and C, Q mutation ({900, 0, v}; Table 4); this is the only 
instance of personally best R predominance under viscosity.  Zero forager mortality removes the 
foraging game and so the utility of coordination assignment, but focus on this value allows us to 
disentangle the (somewhat stochastic) effects of reduced colony replacement fitness and forager 
mortality.  With positive forager death, foraging is weakly altruistic (sensu Wilson 1979, 1990); a 
forager enhances her personal fitness, but her groupmates gain more.  Without forager death this 
cost vanishes; replacing R should always be superior to suicidal P.  But R's advantage must be 
translated into evolutionary competition.  Viscosity effectively precludes such competition under 
Q only mutation, as we next show. 
 
 Q only mutation.  Without forager death, Q, unilaterally refusing to forage, is never a best 
response; mutant Q's appearing in either a P or R vacant tree patch are eliminated, as their sole 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 33 
 
 
 
consequence is to reduce colony fitness by forcing replacement (when Q is the assigned forager).   
So quitter Q can affect P, R relative success only when all three strategies appear within the same 
arena (empty tree).  Under viscosity, such PQR (pre-nest) foundress pools are relatively 
infrequent; here noise appears to mask any advantage for replacement R, with P, R winning 
equally (48% vs 49.5%; Table 4, {900, 0, v}). 
 
 C, Q mutation.  Shirker/replacer C consumes P clusters by forcing replacement 
opportunities at the C, P cluster boundary via CCP vs CPP groups; groups with two or more C’s, 
on average, fair better than groups with just one.   R, C boundaries, however, are neutral, as, CCR 
and CRR are phenotypically identical when cheating occurs, both exhibiting replacement foragers.  
At {900, 0, v}, the cost of cheating in CCP groups with both cheater and replacer C is offset by 
the fitness depression endured by P in CPP groups where C is the assigned (refusing) forager.  
Clustered R, free of this effect, does quite well, winning 66% of trials relative to P’s 9%  ({900, 0, 
v}, C,Q mutation; Table 4).  With low replacement fitness (200; Table 3) the effect is reduced if 
not lost in noise, as replacement leads infrequently to brood war victory and placement as an adult 
colony; here P and R win nearly equally in fair contests (45.5% vs 54.5%; Table 3, {200, 0, v}, 
C,Q mutation). 
 
 If P’s vulnerability at {900, 0, v} is due to self clustering, P should fair better absent 
clustering.  Such is the case:  holding replacement fitness at 900, P wins 37% of fair trials when 
cofoundresses group randomly throughout the population ({900, 0, r}, C,Q mutation; Table 6), 
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relative to its parallel 9% under viscosity ({900, 0, v}, C,Q mutation; Table 4).  As expected, P’s 
enhanced victory at {900, 0, r} is at the expense of C.  While R wins almost identically here under 
either viscosity or population wide dispersal, C never wins a trial at {900, 0, r}, but does capture 
24.5% of all trials under viscosity ({900, 0, v}; Table 4). 
 
 Weak altruism benefits suicidal punishment 
 Once there is true personal cost to replacement (possible forager death), shirker/replacer 
C’s performance against R at their cluster boundary improves, as a shirking C forces R to assume 
true risk, yielding 99.5% C wins under low to medium forager death and weak brood raiding 
({900, [.2,.5], v}; Table 4); R shifts from predominance absent forager mortality (winning 66% of 
all trials) to complete failure.  The effect is duplicated under strong brood raiding, where now 
either P or quitter Q predominate, but requires greater forager risk for complete failure of R (at 
{200, .8, v} with C,Q mutation; Table 3).  Groups with replacing R are then more readily 
eliminated via brood raiding, requiring greater mortality (weak altruism) per instanced replacement 
to generate the same effect.  Similarly, when the sophisticated shirker/replacer C is precluded, 
suicidal punishment’s elimination of rare (phenotypic) quitter Q creates predominately P wins at 
{200, .8, v} and {900, .5, v} (Tables 3, 4). 
 
 Random assortment with strong brood raiding 
 Q only mutation.  By removing the spatial correlation between the descendants of 
personally best response replacers and successful cheaters, population wide offspring dispersal 
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should enhance (relative) R wins, as is mildly apparent under 200 replacement fitness at [.5,.9] 
forager deaths with quitter Q only mutation (Table 5 vs Table 3).  Some P wins under viscosity are 
now distributed to R and Q, reflecting how these latter strategies harm themselves under viscosity 
(e.g., P clusters no longer destroy neighboring Q clusters).  Strong brood raiding still tends to 
remove first instanced phenotypic cheaters; combined with the removal of cheater incubation, R 
achieves more wins through drift, but never does significantly better than P, usually still 
performing worse. 
 
 C, Q mutation.  Allowing mutation to C shifts even more wins to quitter Q at the expense 
of both suicidal P and replacing R (Table 5).  R does improve its performance at {200, .5, r} 
relative to viscous dispersal {200, .5, v}, winning 51% of all trials rather than just 36% (Tables 3, 
5).  The effect, however, is due not to R employing a (superior) personally best response, but to 
suicidal P’s failure to indirectly aid P clones within other arena colonies under random mixing:  P 
wins decline from 63.5% under {200, .5, v} (with C mutation) to 49% under {200, .5, r}.  Here, 
absent viscosity, R does no better than winning randomly (51% for R vs 49% for P) given the 
50:50 P,R starting conditions per trial.  Random victory is the best R can muster throughout Table 
5. 
 
 Cheater/replacer polymorphism under random assortment  
 Table 6 employs random assortment with weak brood raiding, parameters most distant 
from the population ecology of Acromyrmex versicolor.  Here the high viability of colonies with 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 36 
 
 
 
replacers (900 vs 200) enhances the success of cheating, which also enhances the success of 
replacement, since the fitness of phenotypic replacers and cheaters is not correlated spatially.  Nor 
can suicidal P expect other arena colonies to contain mostly P clones.  As expected, replacing R 
does its personally best. 
 
 Q only mutation.  Without C mutants, replacing R outperforms suicidal P within the 
forager mortality range [0,.5]; at greater forager death, predominance shifts to quitter Q (Table 6).  
The value of cheating increases with forager death; at {900, .5, r} a robust polymorphism is 
reached, with neither R nor Q achieving a 95% frequency for 100,000 years. 
 
 C, Q mutation.  Shirker/replacer C couples the benefits of both R and Q (Table 2).  When 
C is present, R's relative performance against P declines (in the range [.1,.2], Table 6), with C 
rather than R in polymorphism with Q at {900, .5, r} (Table 6).  {900, .5, r}, with or without C 
mutation, are the only fair contest runs which clearly conform to the logic of subgame perfection 
(sensu Selten 1975; cf, e.g., West Eberhard 1981; Myles 1988), with individuals exhibiting a 
personally best, situationally specific, response (cheat when you can get away with it, but limit 
cost [replace] when exposed to a cheater), revealed as a “stable” cheater/replacer polymorphism 
through 100,000 years.  Cheating, of course, cannot be personally advantageous without 
replacement, so, under our strategy set, the two properties are frequency dependent.  While 
replacement should be personally advantageous irrespective of weak/strong brood raiding, 
subgame perfect “ties” (polymorphism in cheater/replacement) appear only under weak brood 
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raiding; i.e., only under low group cost to cheating.  Under high group cost (strong brood raiding), 
colony success under replacement is so unlikely (relative to coordinated groups) as to be 
undetectable in our finite population.  So, while {900, .5, r} reveals polymorphism and the clear 
elimination of suicidal P, {200, .5, r} trials reveal P and R equally likely to win fair contests 
(Tables 5, 6). 
 
  Wins against selection 
 Population wide random assortment reveals nonsensical P,R wins under certain forager 
death irrespective of brood raiding and admissible mutation ({200, 1, r}, {900, 1, r}; Tables 5, 6).  
Recall that simulations begin each generation by “killing,” on average, 5 adult colonies (actually, a 
little less, given the restriction detailed earlier for computational ease).  Under population wide 
dispersal, frequencies defining cofoundress encounter are derived by aggregating the remaining 
queen genotypes in living adult colonies.  Adult queen frequencies are then changed, after 
selection among natal colonies under vacated trees, by about 5 colonies.  This feature of natural 
history is consistent across all brood raiding and forager death, and tends to shift adult colony 
genotype frequencies slowly across generations.  Such incremental shifts allow for random walks 
which can drift against selection (cf Binmore et. al., 1995 for a similar process).  These walks may 
yield high disequilibrium frequencies of P, R which, given our 95% stop criterion, can create a 
trial win.  The walks are also biased in favor of suicidal P.  As P achieves high frequency by 
chance, suicide against a phenotypic cheater will tend to preserve this frequency, relative to high 
frequency R, which will nurture a cheater.  The long term trajectories of both P,R are downward, 
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but the opportunity to walk against selection is greater in P at increasingly higher P frequencies.  
Wins under certain death should then be more common for P, and so they are  ({200, 1, r}, {900, 
1, r}; Tables 5, 6); by contrast, viscosity exhibits only one win for P under certain forager death 
and none for R (Tables 3, 4). 
 
 More generally, we suspect such random walks are responsible for the paucity of 
cheater/replacer polymorphism in Table 6.  While such polymorphism is expected theoretically, 
each trial must run for 100,000 years to declare a tie win.  If the equilibrium frequency is 
sufficiently skewed to either cheater or replacer, walk away from that frequency over a prolonged 
simulation time is not surprising; our 95% frequency win condition may then incorrectly assign 
victory to a pure strategy.  That {900, .5, r} polymorphism survives for 100,000 years only about 
75% of the time (Table 6) suggests the process is operating even there. 
 
 Limited polymorphism need not be interpreted as a simulation artifact; it may just as well 
be a consequence of the natural history simulated.  While nature will not stop after a declared win, 
significant variance in expected frequencies may be common in finite populations of perennial 
colonies through an extended random walk, including saturation of a morph against equilibrium.  
Extended simulations of evolutionary stability support this.  While P is always lost under the 
parameter sets of Table 6, in some of these sets it almost always recovers to saturate given back 
mutation from cheating to coordination (P).  The effect is stochastic, requiring repeated long term 
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trials, but predictable, allowing us to infer when P may recover after loss and when it cannot.  
These results will be considered in a subsequent effort. 
 
 Conclusion 
  Suicidal punishment as altruism 
 Our fair contest trials support earlier evidence for suicidal punishment revealed 
experimentally among Acromyrmex versicolor cofoundresses (Rissing et. al., 1996).  Such 
evidence is especially disconcerting because, in the isolated world of a single colony, there is no 
beneficiary for suicide.  We have detailed by simulation that beneficiaries do exist–latent punishers 
(and their offspring consequently less exposed to cheating) within otherwise rival colonies (cf 
Pollock 1988).  The effect is most sustainable under parameters inferred from A. versicolor natural 
history, but possible under a wider range of conditions; our simulations also reveal that sufficient 
divergence from A. versicolor natural history eliminates sustainable suicide. 
 
 Having identified a (same strategy type) beneficiary, we can claim suicidal punishers are 
altruistic.  They are, moreover, maximally altruistic,  removing themselves from the (potential) 
reproductive pool without a standard kin structure (cf J. B. Wilson 1987; Pollock 1988, 1994a; 
Taylor 1992a,b; Wilson et. al., 1992).  Their altruism is not, however, strong (sensu Wilson 1979) 
since the recipient of altruism lies outside of the group affected by their behavior.  Standard 
definitions of altruism fail to capture this long distance beneficiary effect, biasing intuition against 
the Acromyrmex versicolor cheater experiment. 
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 Without a prior understanding of A. versicolor’s population ecology, we would be unable 
to account for our earlier experiment.  Here behavior (suicidal failure to replace) is not just a 
strategic response; it is a strategic response embedded in population structure.  Behavioral 
experiments are difficult enough when just considering “game playing” subjects.  Overlaying 
population structure within the same experiment (e.g., forcing “normal,” single forager natal 
colonies to brood raid those with experimentally induced “cheaters”) would be herculean.  
Simulation, as employed here, allows us to link separate experiments as a single evolutionary 
process.  Doing so, we find that what may be personally advantageous in one generation may so 
alter future genotype frequencies as to be catastrophic several generations later.  Replacing a 
cheater does indeed aid self; but it aids the cheater more.  Correlating the descendants of replacers 
and cheaters across generations through viscosity ultimately removes the personally best response 
replacer from the population, even though replacement always remains the personally best 
response to cheating.  Suicidal punishment, by removing cheaters in their first instance, preserves 
cooperative environments for (latent) punishers in future generations through the same viscous 
process so lethal to replacers.  An intuition of contingent personal advantage (Selten 1975, 1978; 
West Eberhard 1981; Myles 1988) is simply unable to frame the dynamic we have articulated 
herein.  Situationally specific, personally best response places a strategy in a single, focal 
environment; our results show that a strategy which cares not so much for itself in all possible 
social environments may radically outperform one that does (Pollock 1988, 1994a). 
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  Plausible mutant and stability 
 One might respond to the Acromyrmex versicolor cheating experiment by viewing it so 
artificial as to reveal nothing about true cofoundress strategies.  Differential closing of the exit to 
make the prior surface excavator into a “cheater” (detailed above) will certainly have no analog in 
nature.  One might argue that the other queens fail to replace this false cheater precisely because 
there is no natural analog to this social environment.  In the parlance of economics, the queens are 
boundedly rational (sensu Selten 1978), unable to respond to what never occurs or is otherwise 
outside of their (evolved) perception.  There is great force to this observation generally.  Mutations 
are restricted to variation on prior types (Darwin 1859; Dawkins 1980; Maynard Smith 1984), and 
there is no reason to expect experimentation will always conform in perception to mechanistically 
admissible mutants. 
 
 The present issue is not, however, the differentially blocked exit, but whether prior 
nonforaging queens can plausibly be expected to replace upon perceived demise of their fungus 
garden.  We think whatever force bounded rationality has is removed herein by the simple fact that 
queens produce, in their workers, a genotype which regularly coordinates foraging and fungus 
tending; this genotype must be able to assess the garden’s health and the need for foraging 
replacement, and this genotype will exist among even unrelated cofounding queens.  Once workers 
eclose, the forager queen continues to forage awhile, entraining her first workers; she removes 
herself only when workers are able to proceed alone (Higgins 1988).  Indeed, the surface excavator 
specialist coordination event is itself simply an instance of coordinated excavation among workers 
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(e.g., Anderson and Ratnieks 2000).  Our cofoundress have these coordination mechanisms already 
built into them; (uninseminated) A. versicolor alates sometimes fail to disperse from their parental 
nest, rather removing their wings to become (foraging) workers (Rissing, unpublished data).  It is, 
then, a deviation on their prior worker genotype to refuse to forage even though their fungus is 
dying, a catastrophic event by any measure of colony viability.  Selection has acted on 
cofoundresses to suppress a prior response contingently, as revealed by controls, where 
cofoundress do replace the assigned forager upon her demise (Pollock and Rissing 1995; Rissing 
et. al., 1996).  We suggest, then, that absent a strategy designed to monitor potential cheating, our 
cofoundresses, employing their worker program, should forage rather than let their fungus die. 
 
 The issue of plausible mutation is perhaps more relevant to our constructed shirker/replacer 
strategy C.  We think C implausible to a behavioral ecologist; but otherwise to a game theorist, 
who would demand the strategy space be flushed out before analysis.  Because shirking and 
replacing are distinct behaviors in different phases of the (potential) two stage game, we feel 
compelled to consider their combination as strategy C, especially in a haploid model where 
shirking/replacing are really no more than separate behaviors defined by two distinct loci (Table 
2).  Here game theory compels consideration of a Darwinian variant which, while undetected in 
either “natural” or “cheater induced” colonies, significantly tilts results against both naturally 
revealed coordination (leading to saturation of either quitter Q or some mixture of C,Q) and 
experimentally induced punishment (in populations predominantly C). 
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 Most importantly, C may facilitate the loss of coordination and then disappear itself, 
leaving an all Q remnant.  While behavioral ecology clues behavioral properties, game theory, by 
flushing these properties into a closed strategy space, may identify real, crucial evolutionary states 
which otherwise go unnoticed because ephemeral.  If the result of these ephemeral transitions is 
absent in the field (as is the case for Acromyrmex versicolor where collected), the behavioral 
ecologist may have an important clue as to how her population is structured, so precluding the 
game theoretically possible transition state.  Simulations reveal C acts as a transition more under 
strong brood raiding with random dispersal rather than with viscous dispersal (Tables 3, 5, and 
above), the latter being the population structure inferred for A. versicolor.  We argued earlier that 
shirker/replacer C, even where a dominant simulation outcome, may actually be little more than 
transitory upon introduction of plausible, replacement delaying, mutants.  Under viscosity, C 
sometimes predominates (a likely transition state) under weak but never under strong brood raiding 
(Tables 3, 4, and above).  Laboratory evidence suggests brood raiding is strong (Rissing and 
Pollock 1987, 1991; Tschinkel 1992a).  This confluence of viscosity and strong brood raiding is 
exactly where simulation predicts strategy C, urged by game theory, should fail as transition, 
compatible with the laboratory assay of ubiquitous surface excavator/forager coordination. 
 
  A conjecture for human experiments 
 Herein we employed simulation to link various experiments into a single evolutionary 
process.  Such simulation may also facilitate experimental parallel across biology and social 
science.  In economics, the ultimatum game is similar to the coordination game detailed herein.  
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Briefly, a subject is given a divisible resource (often money) and told to divide it any way she likes 
with her game partner.  The latter may either accept the offer or not; if he refuses, neither subject 
receives anything.  Thus the recipient can veto the offered division at cost to both parties.  A game-
theoretically “rational” recipient should accept any positive amount, for otherwise he gets nothing; 
his partner should provide the smallest divisible amount, keeping the rest for herself.  Experiment 
reveals, however, that substantial offers, of as much as 20-30% are rejected, with small amounts 
almost always so (Camerer and Thaler 1995).  Divisions approaching 50:50 equity are readily 
accepted.  Our analysis of intergroup competition and sustainable personally harmful punishment 
suggests a mechanism for this revealed human irrationality.  If subjects are sampled from 
(multiple) group environments where equity is expected, rejecting recipients may be punishing 
much as Acromyrmex versicolor queens do.  We all know, from stories or experience, of groups in 
contention doing poorly relative to groups in harmony.  It seems that both human and ant may 
produce more contention than is individually rational.  Perhaps intergroup competition is a hidden 
selection agent in the ultimatum game; humans, subject generally to competitive group structures, 
may tend to retain responses molded by such structure even isolate in the laboratory.  But humans, 
unlike ants, can perceive something of their “external” population structure; indeed, the human 
ability to rapidly entrain into groups may facilitate design employing intergroup competition, 
relative to other species.  We suggest that placing subjects in a perceived competitive group 
structure will augment the “irrational” behavior the ultimatum experiment reveals.  If so, the 
parallel with A. versicolor will be even more striking. 
 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 45 
 
 
 
 Acknowledgments 
 GBP and AC are indebted to Professor Ken Binmore, past Academic Director of the Centre 
for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, Economics Department, University College, 
London, where both were located for a year.  GBP was supported as a Research Fellow at the 
Centre, a Senior Fulbright Fellowship, Wirtschaftstheorie III (under Professor Dr. Avner Shaked), 
Economics Department, University of Bonn (where simulation support was also provided), and 
KALX, LLC.  AC was supported by the Human Capital and Mobility Program of the European 
Union (contract # ERB CHBGCT 930443), Spanish Ministry of Education grants # PB96-0302 
(under the DGICYT program) and # BEC2000-1029, the Generalitat of Catalonia grant # 
1997SGR-00138, the visitor program of Wirtschaftstheorie III (under Professor Dr. Avner 
Shaked), Economics Department, University of Bonn, and the Research Distinction Program of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya. 
  
 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 
 The effect of experimentally induced "cheating" on colony development 
 (from Rising et al. 1996) 
 
  Control 
 
mean + SD (N) 
Experimental 
 
mean + SD (N) 
P 
(two-sample, two- 
tailed t-test) 
Days until 
replacement appears
 
5.4 + 4.7 (9) 
 
17.2 + 4.6 (10) 
 
.001 
Days until 
 replacement 
forages1 
 
9.9 + 6.6 (9) 
 
22.8 + 4.1 (10) 
 
0.001 
Number of pupae 
and large larvae at 
termination 
 
1.6 + 1.8 (9) 
 
0.2 + 0.6 (10) 
 
.05 
 
Fungus garden 
mass2, mg 
 
52.2 + 51.8 (8) 
 
2.0 + 3.7 (8)3 
 
0.02 
 
1Experiment was terminated on day 29, when the last control colony exhibited a replacement; as 
some experimentals had not, this measure truncates experimental replacement time. 
 
2The fungus mass from one control and two experimental colonies were lost during measurement. 
 
3While the fungus garden died in 7 of 10 experimentals, these were provided more fungus 
thereafter to continue observations; in no case did the garden die among controls. 
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 Table 2 
 Admissible strategies by two-stage game properties 
“+” indicates presence, “-“ absence 
 
Strategy Accepts original foraging 
assignment 
Replaces a shirker of 
original foraging assignment
P + - 
Q - - 
R + + 
C - + 
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 Table 3 
 Proportion of “fair contest” wins by forager death1 
 colony fitness under replacement 200 
strong brood raiding, viscous dispersal 
forager 
death 
 
P wins 
 
R wins 
 
C wins 
 
Q wins 
 
P,R tie 
 
P,Q tie 
1 0, .005 0, 0 .005, na2 .995, .995 –, -- --, -- 
0.9 .04, .73 0, 0 0, na .96, .265 –, -- --, .005 
0.8 .81, .95 0, .005 0, na .185, .045 –, -- .005, -- 
0.5 .635, .54 .36, .45 0, na 0, 0 .005, .01 –. -- 
0.2 .495, .49 .5, .49 0, na 0, 0 .005, .02 –, -- 
0 .455, .485 .545, .505 0, na 0, 0 0, .01 –, -- 
1Fair contests begin with populations 50% (latent) suicidal punisher P, 50% replacer R; 
proportions are based on 200 trials per parameter set.  Intergroup competition (relative intercolony 
brood raiding ability) and dispersal are defined in the text.  Forager death is the probability that a 
forager dies in the idealized single event foraging game (see text).  P ( R) wins upon obtaining 
95% of the population with rival R (P) eliminated; cheater morphs C or Q win upon reaching 95% 
of the population with both P, R eliminated.  A tie among surviving strategies results when neither 
condition has been met by generation 100,000.  Thus P ( R) outperforms R (P) as their ratio of 
wins increases beyond 1; relative performance does not imply absolute superiority in the strategy 
space, as a “cheater” morph may win overall.  First cell entry is proportion of wins for column 
strategy under mutation paths  P,R,C,Q e C, Q with uniform mutation probability .001 (see text 
for discussion); second cell entry provides the same proportion under mutation paths P,R e Q, 
again with probability .001, where strategy C has been excluded (see text).  Comparing entries 
within a cell measures presence (absence) of shirker/replacer C on the focal strategy’s 
performance; comparing first (second) entries across columns measures the relative performance 
of strategies under identical mutation paths.  Table 3 simulates the population ecology of 
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Acromyrmex versicolor.  Personally best response R (marginally) outperforms suicidal punisher P 
only under zero forager death, where the foraging game has been removed, while (latent) suicidal 
P outperforms all admissible rivals under significant (.5, .8) forager mortality. 
 
2na = "not applicable", as here strategy C is precluded. 
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 Table 4. 
 Proportion of “fair contest” wins by forager death1 
 colony fitness under replacement 900 
  weak brood raiding, viscous dispersal 
 
forager 
death 
P wins R wins C wins Q wins R,C tie P,R tie 
1 0, 0 0, 0 .005, na .995, 1.0 –, -- --, -- 
0.9 0, .705 0, 0 0, na 1.0, .295 –, -- --, -- 
0.8 .01, .995 0, 0 .01, na .98, .005 –, -- --, -- 
0.5 .005, .98 0, 0 .995, na 0, .02 –, -- --, -- 
0.2 .005, .49 0, .505 .995, na 0, 0 –, -- --, .005 
0 .09, .48 .66, .495 .245, na 0, 0 .005, -- --, .025 
 
1See Table 3 for explanation of entries.  Weak intergroup competition (high replacement fitness 
after a cheating event; see text) shifts wins away from punisher P to cheaters C, Q, rather than to 
personal best response R (Table 4 vs Table 3), with R significantly outperforming P only under no 
forager death, where the forager game is absent. 
 Pollock, Cabrales, Rissing:  the disadvantage in personal advantage, 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 
 Proportion of “fair contest” wins by forager death1 
 colony fitness under replacement 200 
  strong brood raiding, random assortment 
 
forager 
death 
 
P wins 
 
R wins 
 
C wins 
 
Q wins 
1 .145, .23 .025, .10 .04, na .79, .67 
0.9 .24, .41 .025, .165 .045, na .69, .425 
0.8 .43, .515 .14, .265 .015, na .415, .22 
0.5 .49, .51 .51, .49 0, na 0, 0 
0.2 .45, .535 .55, .465 0, na 0, 0 
0 .44, .51 .56, .49 0, na 0, 0 
 
1See Table 3 for explanation of entries.  Personally best response R mildly outperforms suicidal 
punishment (P) under real but low forager mortality (.2) (when strategy C is allowed; cf Table 5 vs 
Table 3, which hold colony replacement fitness constant at 200), although R still trails P at higher 
rates of mortality. 
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 Table 6. 
 Proportion of “fair contest” wins by forager death1 
 group fitness under replacement 900 
weak brood raiding, random assortment 
 
forager 
death 
P wins R wins C wins Q wins C,Q tie R,Q tie 
1 .015, .055 0, .005 .065, na .92, .94 –, -- --, -- 
0.9 .045, .175 0, .01 .065, na .89, .815 –, -- --, -- 
0.8 .065, .295 0, 0 .06, na .875, .705 –, -- --. -- 
0.5 .115, .25 0, .015 .145, na 0, 0 .74, -- --. .735 
0.2 .225, .305 .11, .695 .665, na 0, 0 –, -- --, -- 
0 .37, .385 .63, .615 0, na 0, 0 –, -- --, -- 
 
1See Table 3 for explanation of entries.  Table 6 represents conditions most at variance with 
those identified for Acromyrmex versicolor: population wide, random assortment of queens, with 
weak intergroup competition (high brood colony fitness after forager replacement).  Here 
personally best response R exhibits its best performance against suicidal punisher P, but only at 
low forager mortality (.2; cf Tables 4, 5); elsewhere, P remains marginally better.  The C,Q and 
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R,Q ties at .5 forager mortality are the only parameters where the theoretically expected frequency 
dependence between cheating (as Q) and replacement (as R or C) is confirmed by fair contest 
simulations (see text). 
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